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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
The matter presently before this Court was initiated with the filing of a ~ o t i c e  of Appeal 
("Appeal"), appealing the decision of the District Court for the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho in and for the County of Canyon ("District Court") on a Petition for Review of Administrative 
Order ("Petition"). R, pp. 12-14. The Petition, filed by Petitioner-Appellant Bryan Lee McDaniel 
("McDanieI"), requested review of a decision from the Respondent Idaho Transportation Department 
("ITD"), by and through its Hearing Officer, Michael J. Kane ("Hearing Officer"). Id The 
administrative decision in question sustained a Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing 
(Advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code) ('Wotice of Suspension"). Administrative 
Record, p.3 and pp. 53-60. Ultimately, the decision of the Hearing Officer was upheld by the District 
Court, resulting in the Appeal. R, pp. 10-1 1. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
On June 20, 2008, McDaniel was arrested for the crime of driving under the influence of 
alcohol pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8004. As a result of a Notice of Administrative License 
Suspension from ITD dated June 27, 2008, McDaniel's driving privileges were suspended effective 
August 8,2008, for aperiod ofninety (90) days for failing evidentiary testing pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 18-8002(A) ("Suspension"). Administrative Record, p. 16. McDaniel requested areview ofthe 
Suspension pursuant to a Request for Hearing dated July 7,2008. Administrative Record, pp.19-20. 
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McDaniel was timely provided notice of a telephonic hearing, as well as additional information 
regarding the telephonic hearing. The matter came on for hearing on August 6, 2008, by telephone 
conference ("Evidentiary Wearing"). Administrative Record, pp. 53-60. On August 14,2008, after the 
Evidentiary Hearing, the Hearing Officer issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order. Id The Suspension as set out in the Notice of Suspension was sustained, resulting in the 
Petition being filed by McDaniel on September 9,2008. Administrative Record, pp. 61-64. As aresult 
of the Petition, this matter came before the District Court on oral argument on June 10, 2009. 
Administrative License Hearing (hereinafter "ALS") Tr, p. 4,ll. 4:2 to 5:8. The District Court ruled 
from the bench affirming the Hearing Officer's Decision and issued its Order on Petition for Judicial 
Review on July 15,2009. R, pp. 10-1 1. 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
On June 20,2008, at approximately 7:29 p.m. Officer T. Shearn ofthe Canyon County Sheriff s 
Office ("Officer Shearn") was dispatched to the area of Logan Street and Fannway Road in Canyon 
County in response to a report of a dune-buggy type vehicle cutting a driver off on the roadway. 
Administrative Record, p. 7. Within a few minutes of the report, Officer Sheam arrived at the area. 
After locating a dune-buggy type vehicle at approximately 7:35 p.m. in a driveway with four occupants 
in it, Officer Shearn observed the dune-buggy pull out from the driveway and drive east. Id. The 
Officer followed and could not locate a license plate on the vehicle. After following the vehicle for a 
short period of time, it turned off on a dirt lane at which time Officer Shearn stopped the dune-buggy. 
Id. During the course of his investigation, Officer Sheam approached McDaniel from the driver's side 
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of the vehicle. Officer Shearn observed that McDaniel's eyes were blood shot and glassy. He could 
smell the odor of alcoholic beverages coming from McDaniel and asked McDaniel for his driver's 
license and paperwork on the vehicle. Id. Although McDaniel indicated he did not have his license on 
his person, he verbally identified himself as Bryan Lee McDaniel and indicated his driver's license 
number was AA119456D. Id Through the course of Officer Shean's discussions withMcDaniel, he 
admitted to having three (3) beers. McDaniel was asked and agreed to perform a field sobriety test 
which he did not perform in a satisfactory manner and was thereafter transported to the jail for further 
testing. Administrative Record, pp.7-8. McDaniel was played the audio version ofthe Idaho Advisory 
18-8002/18-8002(A) and McDaniel agreed to submit to a breath test. The results of the Intoxilyzer 
5000 breath tests were ,0831,083. Administrative Record, p.8. McDaniel was subsequently charged and 
released for driving under the influence. Id 
A Request for administrative hearing was timely received by ITD and the Hearing Officer 
conducted the Evidentiary Hearing by telephone. McDaniel was represented at the hearing by attorney 
Richard L. I-Ianis. The decision of the Hearing Officer sustained the Suspension and McDaniel's 
driving privileges were suspended by ITD. McDaniel then timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
and his Suspension was stayed pending the District Court's review. The District Courl affirmed the 
decision of the Hearing Officer resulting in the Appeal which is presently before this Courl 
11. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did McDaniel meet his burden of proof as set forth in Idaho Code Section 18- 
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2. Is the Hearing Officer obligated to acknowledge any inherenr error in the Intoxilyzer 
5000? 
3. Was the burden of proof in this matter shifted from McDaniel to ITD? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of ITD decisions to 
deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See, Idaho Code $8 
49-201(West 2006), 49-330(West 2006), 67-5201(2) (West 2006), 67-5270 (West 2006); See also, 
Bennett v. State ofIdaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, -, 206 P.3d 505,506 (Ct. 
App. 2009); In re Sztspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,941, 155 P.3d 1176, 
11 80 (Ct. App. 2006). A court may overturn an agency's decision only when the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Idaho 
Code § 67-5279(3) (West 2006). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that 
the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right 
of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Board of Cozinty Commissioners, 131 
Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1 998); See also, Bennett at -, 206 P.3d at 506; In re Driver's 
License Szqension ofMurshnll, 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
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The reviewing court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless such findings are 
clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Cory., 130 Idaho 923, 926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). 
See also, Bennett at -, 206 P.3d at 506; Marshall at 340,48 P.3d at 669. The agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the District Court. Id See also, Gibbar at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180. A 
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
presented, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the agency's 
determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. ldaho Code 5 67- 
5279(1) (West 2006). See also, Bennett at -, 206 P.3d at 506; Gibbar at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180; 
Marshall at 340, 48 P.3d at 669; Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Board of Commissioners, 134 
Idaho 353,357,2 P.3d 738,742 (2000). 
B. McDaniel Has Failed To Meet His Burden Set Forth In Idaho Code Section 18-8002A. 
As set forth in his Petition and Appeal, McDaniel seeks the reversal of the Hearing Officer's 
decision on the bases that the Hearing Officer (1) "did not credit the expert testimony presented" by 
McDaniel and (2) did not account for the "inherent error in the operation ofthe Intoxilyzer machine. . ." 
Administrative Record, p. 62. See also, R, p.13. Essentially, McDaniel asserts that there is doubt 
whether his blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") actually exceeded the maximum concentration level 
of .O8 as prescribed by Idaho Code Section 18-8004. From this, he concludes the Hearing Officer's 
Decision was in error. However, McDaniel's argument fails to specifically address any of the five (5) 
criteria set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) and, as the Hearing Officer noted, this assertion 
has no relevance to these proceedings. R, pp. 12-14; Administrative Record, pp. 53-60; Appellant's 
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Brief, pp. 3-8 
As recently as April of last year, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to discuss 
McDaniel's burden as required by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A. 
The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of 
several grounds enumerated in I.C. 3 18-8002A(7) for vacating the 
suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho 
Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of 
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly 
when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
Bennett at -, 206 P.3d at 506. (emphasis added). As the person requesting the hearing, McDaniel 
bore the burden of proving these propositions. Id. However, notwithstanding the requirements of 18- 
8002A, McDaniel failed to address the statute or even provide any facts or argument supporting the 
vacation ofthe Suspension under Idaho Code Section 18-8002A. Therefore, as McDaniel has not even 
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made an attempt at meeting his burden with regard to Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7), his Appeal 
should be denied. However, assuming for purposes of argument that the Court disagrees, the following 
addresses McDaniel's failure to meet his burden pursuant to subsections 7(c) and/or 7(d) of Section 18- 
1. McDaniel Has Not Met His Burden With Regard To Idaho Code Section 18- 
8002A(7)(cl. 
With respect to subsection 7(c) of 18-8002A, McDaniel must prove that the test results did not 
show a BAC in excess of .08. While McDaniel did present evidence that his actual BAC could have 
been below .08 (See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-8), section 18-8002A expressly states that the test 
results, not McDaniel's actual BAC2, are the subject of inquiry for purposes of the administrative 
license suspension. At the Evidentiary Hearing, McDaniel neither proved nor presented any evidence or 
argument in support of the proposition that the test results indicated a BAC other than .083/.083. As a 
result, the Hearing Officer correctly concluded that the test results showed an alcohol concentration in 
violation of Idaho Code Section 18-8004. Therefore, as McDaniel has failed to meet his burden 
required by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7)(c), his Appeal must fail. 
2. McDaniel Has Not Met His Burden With Regard To Idaho Code Section 18- 
8002A(7)(dl. 
As with subsection 7(c) of Idaho Code Section 18-8002A, any argument which could be made 
relative to subsectio1l7(d) is similarly misdirected. Subsection 7(d) requires McDaniel show ihat the 
' There is no indication McDaniel takes issue with items (a), (b), and (e) of Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) in his 
Petitiotl or Appellant's Brief 
2 ~ s  the Hearing Officer correctly noted, McDaniel's actual BAC will be at issue at the corresponding criminal trial of 
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test to determine his BAC was not conducted in accordance with Idaho Code Section 18-8004, or that 
the testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered. McDaniei's expert 
witness did not testify to these matters. Instead, he testified only that "there is a potential variable" 
uith the Intoxilyzer 5000. ALS Tr, p. 29, 11. 28:12 to 30:3 (emphasis added). After weighing this 
testimony, the Hearing Officer concluded, "[The expert witness's] testimony that the breath machine 
contains an inherent variable that 'could' have affected the test does not comport with the requirement 
of demonstration that the testing equipment was functioning improperly, and is also speculative in 
nature." Administrative Record, pp. 56-57. Indeed, presuming there exists an inherent variable in the 
testing equipment, tl~is fact alone does not demonstrate that the test was not administered properly or 
that the equipment was not functioning properly. On the contrary, it suggests that the variable exists 
despite the fact that the equipment is working properly and the test is administered in accordance with 
the statute. See, Nelson v. Commonwealth, 430 S.E.2d 553, 554 (Virginia App. 1993) (holding that a 
driver must prove a breath testing device's margin of error exceed that deemed scientifically acceptable 
in order for such evidence to call into question the functionality of the breath testing device or the 
accuracy of the test results). As the Hearing Officer noted, although the margin of error evidence may 
be relevant at the criminal trial ofthis matter, it does not comport with the requirement of showing that 
the equipment was working improperly or that the test was administered improperly. Id Therefore, as 
McDaniel has failed to meet his burden required by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7)(d), his Appeal 
must fail. 
this matter. 
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3. MeDaniel's Argument Disregards The A~plicable Standard Of Review. 
Finally, with regard to Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7), assuming McDaniel's argument 
addresses the issues of whether the equipment was working improperly or that the test was 
administered improperly, McDaniel disregards the standard of review that must be applied by this 
Court. In effect, McDaniel is requesting this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Hearing 
Officer as to the weight of the expert testimony presented. However, as the Court of Appeals has 
repeatedly held, such a request is inappropriate. Bennettat -, 206 P.3d at 506. See also, Gibbar 
at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180. So long as the Hearing Officer's factual determinations are supported by 
substantial competent evidence in the record, the Court is bound by them. Id. 
The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicate the Hearing Officer 
weighed the testimony of McDaniel's expert witness, but was ultimately unpersuaded due to "a 
credibility issue." Administrative Record, p. 56. As tile Hearing Officer stated 
[The expert witness's] opinion testimony is based entirely on 
information provided by [McDaniel] as to the number of beers 
[McDaniel] had imbibed and at what time [McDaniel] stopped 
drinking. Hence, [the expert witness's] opinioil was driven entirely by 
anecdotal information. 
Id. As a result, the Hearing Officer did not accord the expert witness's testimony significant weight. 
Although this Court may have accorded the testimony more or less weight, it may ilot substitute its 
opinion for that of the Hearing Officer. Because McDaniel failed to meet his busden or demonstrate 
the required facts, the Hearing Officer correctly sustained the suspension of McDaniel's license. 
Therefore, again, as McDaniel has failed to meet his burden required by 18-8002A(7), his Appeal must 
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fail. 
C. The Hearing Officer's Failure To Acknowledge The Inherent Error In The Intoxilyzer 
5000 Does Not Result In The Decision Being Arbitrary, Capricious Or An Abuse Of 
Discretion. 
As discussed above, McDaniel's entire argument revolves around the assellion that the 
Hearing Officer did not properly credit the expert testimony presented by McDaniel concerning the 
inherent error in the Intoxilyzer 5000, resulting in the possibility that his BAC did not exceed the 
maximum concentration level of .08 as prescribed by Idaho Code Section 18-8004. McDaniel argues 
that the ITD cannot rely on his blood alcohol test results because the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to 
conduct his breath test has an inherent margin of error of ,004 which makes it possible for the actual 
alcohol concentration in his blood to be below the statutory maximum level. To the extent the 
Hearing Officer did not address this alleged inherent variablelmargin of error in the Intoxilyzer 5000, 
McDaniel contends that the Hearing Officer committed reversible error. Appellant Brief p. 7. While 
itis ITD's position that such an argument is not supported by applicabie law, it will directIy address 
the "inherent error" argument at this point. 
1 .  McDaniel Fails, In Part To Cite Authority For His Argument. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) McDaniel is required to support the arguments 
made in his Appellate Brief with citations to authority. McDaniel has violated this rule by making 
the following argument in his brief regarding the Intoxilyzer 5000 margin of error: 
The Intoxilyzer 5000 Operator's Manual which Mr. Beals was 
familiar and used in part in formulating his opinion compares the 
operation of the machine and it's [sic] testing with a "[sic] prior-art 
breath analyzer using volunteer hinkers and measuring the difference 
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in readings between the two. Testing over time ofthree subjects there 
was a measuring variable of the Intoxilyzer 5000 of -.0007 to +.0 16. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 5. Clearly missing from this argument is any specific citation to authority. 
The obvious reason is that the authority supporting the argument, namely the Intoxilyzer 5000 
Operator's Manual, has been expressly stricken from the Clerk's Record by the District Court's 
Order Sustaining Respondent's Objection to Clerk's Record dated December 1,2009. In making 
the above referenced argument, McDaniel improperly attempts to circumvent both Idaho 
Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) and the District Court's Order to strike the Intoxilyzer 5000 Operator's 
Manual from the Clerk's Record. For these reasons, McDaniel's above referenced argument 
should be disregarded by the Court. 
2. The Hearing Officer Did Not Cominit Reversible Error By Not Addressing The 
Alleged Inherent Variable In The Intoxilvzer 5000. 
Whether a hearing officer in an ALS proceeding must consider evidence of an inherent 
margin of error in the device used to test the driver's BAC has yet to be addressed by Idaho Courts. 
However, the issue has been extensively addressed by the courts of other jurisdictions. The 
conclusion of these courts has primarily hinged upon whether the license revocation statute in force 
in the respective jurisdictions is interpreted to require a driver's license to be revoked upon a test 
reading indicating a blood alcohol level in excess of a statutory limit, or alternatively, upon an 
actual level of alcohol in excess of a statutory limit. Haynes v. Department nfPublic Safe@, 865 
P.2d 753,755 (Alaska 1993). . 
When the statutory language has been interpreted to require license revocation upon "test 
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results indicating a certain blood alcohol levei" the courts have found that their respective 
legislatures considered the margin of error inherent in breath testing machines and deemed said 
margin of errors sufficiently negligible that a driver's license may be revoked irrespective of said 
errors. Accordingly, in these jurisdictiolls the factfinder is allowed to disregard any margin of error 
inherent in the breath testing device. See, e . g ,  PVieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223,225,805 P.2d 1044, 
1046 (App. 1990); Nugent v. Iowci Department ofTvunsportation, 390 N.W.2d 125,128 (Iowa 1986); 
Schildgen v. Commissioners of Pztblic Safety, 363 N.W.2d 800, 801 (Minn.App.1985); State v. 
Lentini, 240 N.J.Super. 330,334-36,573 A.2d 464,466-67 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1990); Slagle v. 
State, 570 S.W.2d 916,919 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Incontrast, when the statutory language has been 
interpreted to require revocatioil upon "actual levels" ofblood alcohol concentration, the courts have 
found their respective legislatures to have either not considered the margin of error inherent in the 
breath testing machines or alternatively to have deemed said margin of errors unacceptable. 
Accordingly, the factfinders in these jurisdictions have been required by the courts to consider said 
margins of error inherent in breath testing devices. See, e.g., State v. Boehmer, 1 Haw.App. 44,46- 
47, 613 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1980); State v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709,709-10,271 N.W.2d 839,840 
(1978); State v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36,38-39,455 N.E.2d 24,27 (Oho Mun.Ct. 1982); State v. 
Keller, 36 Wash. App. 110, 113-14, 672 P.2d 412, 414 (1983). 
As discussed in section II(B)(l), above, Idaho Code Section 18-8002A contains language 
paralleling the "test result" line of cases/statutes and provides for revocation if the test results show 
an alcohol concentration in excess ofthe statutory maximums. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7)(c) (West 
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Supp. 2009). Specifically, Idaho's license suspension statute provides: 
[I]f the test results indicate an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation o f .  . . Idaho 
Code, the department shall suspend the person's driver's license, 
driver's permit, driving privileges or non resident driving privileges. 
Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(4)(a) (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). This language is precise and 
unambiguous and should therefore be given its plain meaning. Cal1ie.r v. O'Nenl, 147 Idaho 841, 
-) 216 P.3d 130,137 (2009). See also, Wernecke v. S t  Maries Joint School District No. 401, 147 
Idaho 277, -, 207 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2009); Nugent at 128. The plain meaning of this language 
requires a driver's license to be suspended upon a test result showing a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.80 or more, not 0.80 plus or minus a margin of error. Id There is nothing in the statutory 
language which can be properly interpreted to plainly mean that ITD must prove a driver's breath 
test result with one hundred percent accuracy or within an alleged margin for potential error. The 
legislature presumably was aware of the inherent variance in the Intoxilyzer 5000 and other devices 
used to conduct BAC tests when it enacted section 18-8002A. Had the legislature found said 
variance unacceptable it could have required the suspension of a driver's license upon the showing of 
an "actud level" of BAC. By conditioning the license suspension on test result, the legislature 
authorized the ITD to disregard the inherent margin of error in the test results. See, Haynes at 755. 
Consequently, the Hearing Officer in this case was not required to consider the inherent margin of 
error in the Intoxilyzer 5000 used to test McDailiel's breath and, therefore, McDaniel's Appeal 
should fail. 
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J .  McDaniel Did Not Present Evidence Sufficient To Shift The Burden Of Proof To 
ITo. 
"The question of where a burden of proof lies is a question of law." Robinson v. State Farm 
Mzirzinl A L ~ O  Inszirance Company, 137 Idaho 173,176,45 P.3d 829,832 (2002). Idaho Code Section 
18-8002A(7) expressly provides that the burden of proof in the setting of an administrative license 
suspension "shall be on the person requesting the hearing." McDaniel contends that by producing 
evidence of an inherent margin of enor in the Intoxilyzer 5000, he shifted the burden from himself to 
ITD. Although not completely clear, McDaniel's argument is fundamentally that he has established 
his prima facie case that the suspension must be vacated and, therefore, the burden of proving the 
negative of each of the enumerated factors in Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) shifts to ITD. 
McDaniel's argument is flawed in several respects. First, McDaniel's fails to city any 
authority to support his argument in violation of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). Idaho Code Section 
18-8002A(7) clearly places the burden of proof upon McDaniel, as the person requesting the hearing. 
No corresponding statutory provision shifts this burden. Had the Legislature desired to include a 
burden shifting provision, it could have done so. The absence of any such language suggests, and 
this Court must conclude, that the Legislature did not intend to allow the party requesting the hearing 
to shift the burden of proof to the other party upon establishing a prima facie case. 
Second, even assuming for arguments sake that the law does provide for such burden shifting, 
McDaniel has failed to establish his prima facie case because he did not show one or more of the 
factors in Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7). As more fully explained above, by submittingevidence 
ofthe Intoxilyzer 5000's inherent margin of enor, McDaniel proves only that it is possible his actual 
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BAC was below 0.08. However, this evidence is insufficient to prove any of the section 18- 
8007A(7) factors, namely that McDaniel's test results did not show a BAC over 0.80, or that the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 was not functioning properly. When, as in this case, a party fails to make a prima 
facie showing, the burden does not shift to the other party. See, Thompson v. Motel 6, 135 Idaho 
373,376, 17 P.3d 874, 877 (2001). 
Even going one step further and assuming, for purposes of argument, that McDaniel can 
establish his prima facie case by proving his actual RAC was possibly below 0.08, McDaniel has still 
failed to establish his prima facie case because the evidence he presented fails to demonstrate this 
possibility is more likely than not. See, Wheeler v. The Idaho Transportatiorz Department, No. 
358392009,2009 WL 32990003, at * 5 (Idaho Ct. App. October 15,2009) (holding that the driver in 
an ALS hearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, at least one of the factors listed in 
Idaho Code Section 18-8007A(7)). McDaniel's argument is analogous to the argument made a 
driver in an attempt to have his driver's license suspension vacated before the Hawaii Supreme 
Court. Lara v. Tanaka, 924 P.2d 192 (Hawaii 1996). The driver's breath test result in Lara 
indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .  107, which exceeded the statutory limit in Hawaii of .lo. 
At the license revocation hearing, the driver in L,ara presented evidence that the device used to test 
his blood alcohol concentration had an inherent margin of error of .Ol, which meant that his actual 
test result could have ranged anywhere from ,097 to ,117.~ 
In determining whether the driver proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his actual 
3 Note that in Hawaii a license is revoked upon an "actual level" of blood alcohol concentration, not upon "test 
results indicating" a particular blood alcohol concentration, which is why the margin of error was even considered by 
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BAC was below the .10 threshold, the court in Lara considered where the driver's test results fell in 
the "possible range" (determined by applying the inherent margin of error ofthe breath testing device 
to the test result) of blood alcohol levels. Assuming the maximum margin of error fell in the driver's 
favor, the driver's BAC at the time his test was administered could have been below. 10. However, 
after considering every possible way the margin of error could fall, there existed a substantially 
greater likelihood that the driver's BAC actually exceeded the 0.10 threshold. For this reason, the 
Lara court concluded that "it was more probable than not that the [driver] had a blood alcohol 
content of . lo% of more." Id at 195. 
McDaniel's test result, like the test result of the driver in Lnra, falls in the upper portion of 
the "possible range" of his actual blood alcohol concentration level. McDaniel's test results were 
0.08310.083, which exceeded Idaho's threshold limit of 0.08 by 0.003. R, p. 4 and pp. 53-60. See 
also, Appellant's Brief at pp. 4-7. The margin of error alleged by McDaniel to exist in the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 is 0.004. Applying this 0.004 margin of error, McDaniel's actual BAC ranged 
anywhere from .079 to ,087. Assuming, as was assumed in Lara, that the maximum margin of error 
were to fall in McDaniel's favor, it is possible that McDaniel's actual BAC did not actually exceed 
the legal tlveshold of 0.080. However, as in Lara, there exists, after considering every possible way 
the margin of error could fall, a substantially greater lilcelihood that the McDaniel's BAC actually 
exceeded the 0.80 threshold. 
Thus, even if this Court determines that McDaniel's driver's license may be vacated by 
the Lava court) 
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proving it is was more probable than not that McDaniel's BAC level was below the legal threshold, 
and even if this court determines that the Iiltoxilyzer 5000's inherent margin of error is evidence 
which should have been considered, the evidence presented by McDaniel regarding the Intoxilyzer 
5000's alleged 0.004 inherent margin of error is insufficient to satisfy McDaniel's burden of proving 
the foregoing by a preponderance of the evidence or shifting the burden to ITD. Therefore, again, as 
McDaniel has failed to meet his burden, his Appeal must fail. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether viewed from the criteria as established by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) or from 
the perspective of the "inberent error" perspective, McDaniel has failed to meet his burden of proof 
Therefore, ITD respectfully requests that McDaniel's Appeal be denied and the Decision of the District 
Court be affilmed. 
DATED this 12 '~  day of February, 2010. 
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